Scepticism about virtue and the five-factor model of personality by Paris, Panos
THIS IS THE PENULTIMATE & UNPROOFED VERSION OF THE MANUSCRIPT. 
The ®nal version of this article is now available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820816000327
Please quote from the published version.
COPYRIGHT: © Cambridge University Press 2016

SCEPTICISM ABOUT VIRTUE AND THE FIVE-FACTOR MODEL OF PERSONALITY
Forthcoming in Utilitas
Panos Paris
University of St Andrews
––––––––––––––
INTRODUCTION
Despite considerable progress in personality psychology, anxiety about whether the psy-
chological theory presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically sustainable (Olin and Doris 
2014, 665) perseveres. Here, I employ the ®ve-factor model of personality, currently the 
consensus view in personality psychology, to respond to a strong reading of the situationist 
challenge whereby most people lack dispositions that are both cross-situationally consis-
tent and temporally stable. To this end, I begin by outlining the version of the situationist 
challenge which, unlike weaker versions, I take to constitute a genuine threat to virtue-the-
oretical thought. Squarely facing this challenge, I suggest, is a task for empirical psycholo-
gy. I therefore turn to introduce the ®ve-factor model of personality, presenting a breadth of 
supporting evidence, while also addressing certain worries it raises; I argue that the ®ve-
factor model of personality dissolves a strong reading of situationism by showing that the 
evidence supports the empirical adequacy of such character traits as are required for 
virtue ethics, and that situationism relies on a false dichotomy between character traits and 
situations. I then turn to dispel certain worries and offer certain considerations to the con-
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clusion that the ®ve-factor model may yet vindicate virtue ethics, so that philosophers in-
terested in virtue theory, and especially virtue ethics,  should take it seriously indeed.1
I. THE STRONG SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE AND VIRTUE ETHICS
Situationists claim that virtue ethics, in construing virtues as global dispositions, relies on 
an empirically inadequate descriptive framework.  Philosophical situationism owes largely 2
to works by John Doris and Gilbert Harman. While I concentrate on Doris articulation of 
the challenge, I am interested here in Harmans somewhat more scathing conclusions, 
since it is these that I think truly threaten virtue ethics.
Doris central contentions are the following. First, the function of trait attributions 
consists in allowing us to (a) interpret, explain, predict, and (b) manipulate behaviour, and 
presumably the inner states from which it ¯ows. This is plausible: we attribute courage to 
explain Alex's jumping into the burning building to save his friend; if we had known Alex 
and thought he was courageous, we might have expected him to do so; and we think that 
his behaviour owes partly to good upbringing and summers spent as a lifeguard. 
Second, character traits performing the aforementioned functions partly owes to he 
fact that they are understood as global dispositions. This is key in Doris argument, since 
this is how character traits, including the virtues and vices, are standardly understood in 
 In this paper, I focus on virtue ethics as opposed to virtue theory in general, although most of my 1
discussion applies, mutatis mutandis, to any character ethics which presupposes traits saliently 
like those presupposed by virtue ethics.
 In this paper I focus on situationism as a philosophical, as opposed to psychological, position. 2
Whereas situationist psychologists, such as Ross and Nisbett (1991), posit the primacy of situa-
tions in explaining behaviour on the basis of experimental evidence, philosophical situationists, 
such as Doris (e.g. 2002) and Harman (e.g. 2000), concentrate on the implications of such work in 
psychology for philosophical theories like virtue ethics.
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moral psychology and virtue theory. As dispositions, traits can roughly be couched in terms 
of conditionals, such as "[i]f a person possesses a trait, that person will engage in trait-rel-
evant behaviours in trait-relevant eliciting conditions with markedly above chance probabil-
ity p. (Doris 2002, 19) Doris understands globalism as the thesis that there are character 
traits meeting the following criteria, something presupposed by virtue theory (see Doris 
2002, 22):
(i) Cross-situational consistency: be manifested consistently over a range of different 
situations that may vary widely in their conduciveness to the traits manifestation
(ii) Temporal stability: yield consistent behaviour over iterations of similar situations 
(iii) Evaluative integration: the occurrence of a given trait with a certain evaluative va-
lence, should be probabilistically (positively) related to other traits with similar valence
Consequently, according to Doris, if these conditions are belied by empirical obser-
vation, then the psychology presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically wanting. In fact, 
evidence suggests that people behave differently in different trait-relevant circumstances 
that call for similar behaviour (Doris 2002 63ff; cf. Adams 2007, 120ff); for instance, people 
might cheat in one subject but not another, or lie among colleagues but not family mem-
bers (Hartshorne and May 1928). Moreover, peoples behaviour is heavily in¯uenced by 
(morally) irrelevant and arbitrary factors, like the presence of authority ®gures, as in Mil-
grams obedience studies, where the vast majority of subjects administered shocks that, 
for all they knew, were deadly (Milgram 1963). More subtle, often unconscious factors, in-
cluding ones mood, others presence, and cognitive biases, also in¯uence behaviour 
(Miller 2009); for instance, helping behaviour is shown to vary with things like ®nding a 
dime (Isen and Levin 1972), or being in a hurry (Darley and Batson 1973), when chancing 
upon one in need.
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Citing an impressive number of experiments, Doris concludes that [s]ystematic ob-
servation typically fails to reveal the behavioral patterns exhibited by globalism; globalist 
conceptions of personality are empirically inadequate. (23) This is because, [i]f disposi-
tional structures were typically so robust as familiar conceptions of character and personal-
ity [suggest], insubstantial factors would not so frequently have such impressive 
effects. (Doris 2002, 28) According to situationists, then, evidence shows situations to be 
better predictors and explanans of peoples behaviour than character traits, thereby un-
dermining both the grounds for thinking that people possess global traits and the utility of 
trait discourse. This, I think, is the situationist claim in a nutshell.
But different readings of the situationist claim are possible. Since, as Doris ac-
knowledges, (i) through (iii) are independent of one another, on one reading, situationism 
denies that most people have traits meeting all three globalist conditions. This reading is 
weak because, put together, (i) through (iii) essentially make the situationist target the 
virtues themselves. Finding people whose character traits satisfy (i) through (iii) is tanta-
mount to identifying virtuous people; hence attacking globalism as construed above only 
undermines the claim that people typically are virtuous. I think that it is largely (iii) that 
leads to this conclusion, for, roughly, it implies an expectation to the effect that people are 
either good or bad, since it claims that virtues are mutually dependent. But (iii) is not even 
universal among virtue theorists, many of whom try to dampen it or reject it outright (e.g. 
Adams 2007; also cf. Sreenivasan 2009). Though there are defenders of the thesis, I take 
it that (iii) is not indispensable for virtue ethics. It is noteworthy that Doris himself seems to 
consider evaluative integration as less important for his project than other criteria, as sug-
gested by his remarks that it is an elusive target for empirical attacks (22), and his ac-
knowledgement that it is less prominent in personality psychology  and  has been the 
object of suspicion (23) even in character ethics. Now, if situationists only denied the 
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widespread existence of virtue, that would amount to a trivial claim already acknowledged 
by Aristotle (1998, 34).
If I am right to think that a conclusion to the effect that there are few virtuous peo-
ple, perhaps none in the random samples used in empirical psychology, would hardly be 
surprising and so would be a rather trivial ®nding, this cannot be what situationists have in 
mind. For it fails to do justice both to their insistence on the force of their conclusions, and 
the pervasiveness of situationism in the literature.
In light of the foregoing, I propose to drop the third requirement, viz., evaluative in-
tegration, and revise the notion of a global character trait as a cross-situationally consis-
tent and stable disposition to behave in a way predictable and explicable by reference to 
the relevant trait. Unless otherwise speci®ed, this is what I shall henceforth mean by glob-
alism, or global disposition or character trait. I will have some things to say on the third 
requirement later on, but ask the reader to set it aside for now.
A situationism truly pernicious to virtue ethics would not just undermine the wide-
spread existence of virtues and vices but the widespread existence of the psychological 
resources required for the development of virtue itself, a ground which we presuppose to 
the extent that we encourage and promote the virtues. If such a basis is poorly supported 
by our best empirical knowledge or, worse, undermined by it, then it would seem that the 
projects just mentioned are futile.  Situationism, as I understand it, denies the claim that 3
most people are capable of virtue, not the claim that most people are virtuous. That these 
are different claims can be seen by the difference between suggesting that most people 
lack the cognitive structure required to pursue a career in science, and denying that most 
people actually do pursue such a career. The latter is, of course, trivial. The reason, more-
 Sabini and Silver (2005, esp. 537, 545, 561-562) seem to me to agree that this is the only perni3 -
cious reading of situationism.
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over, why people are such poor candidates for virtue is that their psychology, in lacking the 
relevant kinds of dispositions, does not readily support traits of the kind that the virtues are 
supposed to be.  In other words, on the strong reading of situationism, people typically not 4
only lack the virtues, but the kind of character traits required for virtues and vices to devel-
op (and virtue ethics to take off), i.e., lack traits meeting both (i) and (ii). While these read-
ings are rarely distinguished, I think that a lot hangs on this distinction.
The argument against virtue ethics, imbued with the strong reading just outlined, is 
the following:
(1) Virtue ethics is a descriptively adequate theory only if there are widespread global 
character traits (i.e., both temporally stable and cross-situationally consistent disposi-
tions to behave in ways predictable and explicable by reference to the relevant traits)
(2) There are no such global character traits that are widespread
(3) Thus, virtue ethics is a descriptively inadequate theory
Harman seems to argue thus when he says that if there is no such thing as a character 
trait and we know that virtue would require having character traits  there is nothing one 
can do to acquire character traits that are  like those possessed by a virtuous 
agent. (Harman 2000, 224; emphasis mine) This conclusion is also implied in Doris re-
sponse to Adams theory of virtue, which is designed to sidestep the situationist challenge. 
Adams construes virtues modularly, modules being local dispositions acquired and mani-
 This claim, in turn, can be understood in different ways. It may be that global traits are psycholog4 -
ically impossible. However, since situationist arguments rely on experiments in empirical psycholo-
gy, it is unclear how these could establish psychological impossibility. Alternatively, it may be that 
human psychology, for the most part, is infertile soil for the cultivation of global traits. Insofar as 
virtues and vices are global traits, most people lack the psychological resources for virtue. 
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fested in speci®c contexts, e.g., the household, of®ce, neighbourhood, etc. (Adams 2007, 
126-131). These can then be combined to yield dispositions that constitute genuine  
virtue[s] (Adams 2007, 127). Doris, however, questions whether the volitional and intellec-
tual strength required for assembling global dispositions resembling virtues out of local 
ones is anything less than extra-ordinary, given situationist evidence (Doris 2010, 
138-139). If Doris scepticism here is warranted, and not question-begging, it must ques-
tion the widespread existence, not of virtues, but of global traits in the sense of cross-situa-
tionally consistent and stable dispositions altogether (cf. Sabini and Silver 2005). This kind 
of scepticism runs deeper than virtue ethicists have delved; but insofar as situationist evi-
dence renders this interpretation psychologically feasible, it shifts the burden of proof to 
virtue ethicists.
This reading of situationism is deeply troubling, for not only does it undermine 
Adams account, but also weakens other available virtue-ethical responses, since virtually 
all discussions of character as comprising virtues and vices presuppose that the wide-
spread existence of temporally stable and cross-situationally consistent dispositions is 
empirically viable. Unless this assumption is validated, then, such discussions are treading 
on it as though situationism was never an option; but this is dubious and question-begging.
To illustrate, consider two plausible objections to situationism. One might charge 
situationists with relying on a false dichotomy between situations and traits, insofar as they 
mistakenly seek to explain behaviour as largely an either/or affair between these two vari-
ables. To support this claim, one may appeal to philosophers like Aristotle who construe 
virtues relationally, namely as sensitive to concrete situational features (cf. Aristotle 1998, 
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38).  Situationist evidence, then, only undermines an intrinsic conception of traits, whereby 5
virtues particular manifestations would, to a considerable extent, be predictable and ex-
plicable without reference to circumstantial considerations. But, ®rst, such a response pre-
supposes that there are global traits, while, second, whether or not character traits are re-
lational is an empirical question. In the next section, I shall be corroborating both of these 
claims.
Alternatively, one might argue that situationists conclusions are unwarranted. Sosa 
argues that situations in¯uence virtually all practical competences, without this warranting 
scepticism about such competences (Sosa 2009). Psychologists ®ndings no more threat-
en virtue than practical competence altogether, insofar as virtue depends on practical wis-
dom, or phronêsis, which structurally parallels practical competences. Sosas example is 
driving competence which, he suggests, is in¯uenced by numerous factors, including 
blood-alcohol levels, mobile-phone use, tiredness, etc. Discovering the in¯uence of each 
of these on driving may have come as a surprise, but none resulted in scepticism about 
driving competence. By analogy, psychologists ®nding shouldnt be taken to warrant situa-
tions, albeit they should alert us to blindspots to phronêsis.
 This approach to traits echoes the CAPS approach (see e.g. Mischel and Soda 1995), which, ac5 -
cording to Miller (2009, 108-129), provides a sophisticated framework for our folk-psychological 
trait discourse, and has recently been employed by philosophers building their own, empirically-
informed theories of virtue (Russell 2009 and Snow 2009). Although I take what I say here to be 
compatible with such views, my aim is not to construct a new theory of character traits, but rather 
to rely on current personality psychology to undermine situationism, on the one hand, and possibly 
rekindle trust in traditional virtue ethics. The CAPS model itself is compatible with the ®ve-factor 
model to be discussed shortly, and often thought to simply elucidate different aspects of personality 
rather than traits themselves (cf. McAdams and Olson 2010), so much of what I say here will pre-
dictably be compatible with that view.
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But imagine a situation where wheels sometimes dont turn, brake hydraulics only 
occasionally function, roads arent ®xed, rules are interpreted differently, etc. Were it so, 
driving competence would be superhuman. Indeed, although things arent half as bad, its 
necessary to circumscribe driving environments, like most environments wherein people 
manifest competences, through regulations, surveillance, etc. Consequently, driving is a 
highly circumscribed and controlled activity. To assume that things are, or could be similar-
ly ordered in morally-salient environments, however, presupposes that people, by and 
large, have global dispositions.
While I think that such arguments do much to address the normative and conceptu-
al threats posed by situationism, they cannot show that, as a matter of fact, most people 
have anything resembling global dispositions. Unless this is shown, however, responses 
proceeding on the assumption that the virtues can be cultivated and possessed by ordi-
nary people remain open to scepticism, since they invariably presuppose the widespread 
possession of global dispositions. There is one clear way of supporting this assumption, 
however, and this is to show that, as a matter of fact, people have character traits under-
stood as (i) cross-situationally consistent and (ii) stable dispositions, which are (a) useful in 
the interpretation, explanation, and prediction of their behaviour and are (b) manipulable if 
it is at all plausible that they can be shaped into virtues and vices. In the next section, I 
turn to empirical psychology to support (a), offering evidence for the claim that people pos-
sess the relevant dispositions. In section III, I address (b) and offer further considerations 
to corroborate the claim that the relevant character traits seems highly promising for refur-
nishing a virtue ethics.
II. THE FIVE-FACTOR MODEL OF PERSONALITY
The ®ve-factor model of personality (FFM) is currently the consensus view in personality 
psychology (Nettle 2007, 30; see Miller 2014, 130 and 130n for references to similar re-
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marks). In this section I argue that it counters the situationist challenge to virtue ethics by 
showing that there are global traits that are situation-sensitive. Hence, situationists rely on 
a false dichotomy. Moreover, such traits, according to the evidence, correlate with observ-
able and predictable behavioural patterns, thereby undermining situationist scepticism 
about the existence of global dispositions.
FFM: Basic Features
Most  personality psychologists today acknowledge at least ®ve personality dimensions, 6
known as Openness, Conscientiousness Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism, 
conceived of as continua along which all individuals vary. An individuals personality (part-
ly) comprises ones traits, i.e., ones levels along each dimension. While not purporting to 
exhaust trait structure, the FFM identi®es the broadest yet informative dimensions of hu-
man personality. These psychologists call factors, distinguishing them from facets, which 
are more ®ne-grained dimensions clustered under each factor, and yield a richer picture of 
personalities (McCrae 2010, 59). Neuroticism, for instance, clusters facets anxiety, de-
pression, anger, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability, while Agreeable-
ness comprises trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-
mindedness (Costa and McCrae 1995, 28).
The following table overviews each dimensions general characteristics. From the 
left, the ®rst column introduces the factor name, the second its target cognitive-affective 
domain, and the remaining ones adjectives describing general tendencies associated with 
polar levels on each traits continuum.  7
 Debate is ongoing concerning whether more dimensions should be added. HEXACO, e.g., is like 6
FFM, with the addition of honesty/humility. See, e.g., Ashton and Lee (2005).
 Table adapted from Nettle (2007, 28, 209)7
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FFM traits are global dispositions, i.e., cross-situationally consistent and temporally 
stable dispositions to behave (and otherwise respond) in a way predictable and explicable 
by reference to the relevant trait. Nonetheless, the behaviours and cognitive-affective re-
sponses associated with them vary with situations. In one psychologists words, FFM traits 
are activated by a particular class of situations (you are in danger), and they facilitate a 
particular set of responses (increases in heart rate, adrenaline and vigilance, desire to 
leave, and so on).  Thus,  a strong predictor of whether [anyone] will be afraid at a 
given moment or not is whether they are, for example, in a medium-sized cage with a wild 
bear. (Nettle 2007, 41) So not only is referring to situations necessary to explain trait-rele-
vant responses, but situations can outweigh trait tendencies. There is therefore no coun-
terexample to trait attribution in the depressed found rejoicing in life, or the recluse fervent-
ly socialising, if one won the lottery, and the others daughter just graduated.
That said, peoples lives carve highly characteristic patterns, both observable and 
predictable upon trait attribution. According to psychologists, such patterns are identi®able 
both within situations, and throughout whole lives (Nettle 2007, 6-9). Not only do peoples 
responses in different circumstances vary with their traits; traits can also predict the kinds 
of situations people are likely to choose, regularly ®nd themselves in, and engender 
through trait-relevant behaviours (Buss 1987). Someone low in Extraversion, e.g., will 
Trait Target High Low
Extraversion responsiveness to 
reward
outgoing, enthusiastic aloof, quiet
Neuroticism responsiveness to 
threat
easily stressed, wor-
ried
emotionally stable
Conscientiousness response inhibition, 
practical reasoning
organised, self-di-
rected
spontaneous, care-
less
Agreeableness regard for others trusting, empathetic uncooperative, hos-
tile
Openness breadth of mental as-
sociations
creative, imaginative, 
eccentric
practical, conven-
tional
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generally avoid crowded events and often get angry at people. This will probably result in 
awkward social encounters, potentially involving unpleasant confrontations, etc. Someone 
high in Neuroticism will often worry about ones performance, behaviour, etc., living in anx-
iety, stress, and possibly periods of depression; others are likely to see them as sensitive 
and emotional, perhaps avoiding too many frequent encounters with them, as these can 
be unpleasant.  
FFM: Worries and Support
Psychologists arrived at the FFM via two routes. First, the lexical approach, which involves 
collecting trait terms from ordinary language, grouping them, and eliminating redundancies 
(John et al. 1988). Second, through questionnaires distributed to subjects asked to assess 
themselves on characteristic behaviours, such as how easily they are stressed or scared, 
how attracted they are to complex artworks, how keenly they attend crowded events, etc. 
Results are then entered into factor analyses. Questionnaire studies have been conducted 
in several languages, numerously replicated, and participants responses compared to rat-
ings acquired from acquaintances, friends, and partners. Different raters results and repli-
cations have yielded high correlations, generally well above .5, suggesting concurrence. 
Longitudinal studies have also been conducted, with participants retaking tests sometimes 
over several years, as in one such study where participants and acquaintances personali-
ty reports were collected over twelve years, with correlations between reports at .65-.85, 
which is highly signi®cant (Costa and McCrae 1980). Factor analyses of the data, more-
over, consistently yield ®ve domains with highly signi®cant correlations, i.e., the FFM fac-
tors (Nettle 2007, 27-32).
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Instead of the FFMs attractiveness, many philosophers have emphasised method-
ological concerns instead.  One feature philosophers object to is the use of aggregate data 8
both in factor analyses and when examining relations between traits and behaviours (e.g. 
Doris 2002; Vranas 2009). This is standardly done in quantitative psychology, on the as-
sumption that single measures cannot inform us about peoples dispositions, or predict 
behaviours, any more than ones score on a single school test predicts future perfor-
mance. Performance over one year, by contrast, better predicts performance over the 
next, ceteris paribus (Epstein 1979). This is partly because individual measurements are 
liable to errors, which aggregations largely correct for. Unsurprisingly, whereas single 
measurement correlation coef®cients stagnate at approximately .30, which has come to be 
known as the personality coef®cient (Mischel 1996, 78), aggregate measures often yield 
correlations above .50 (Nettle 2007, 44-45).
But Doris thinks that using aggregate data overlooks an important function of traits, 
namely that they can predict behaviours even in one-off instances (Doris 2002, 74). Ordi-
nary character discourse hardly re¯ects such apathy. (73) People ask: will my partner 
ever cheat on me?, or will the nanny molest my children on Tuesday? (74). Ignoring such 
predictions is tantamount to abandoning a distinctive commitment of virtue ethics, namely 
the assumption that even where the situational pressures toward moral failure are high,  
one can con®dently predict what the virtuous person will not do. (ibid.)
Now, unlike certainty, con®dence comes in degrees; and whereas no reasonable 
psychologist pretends to know whether anyone will molest another anytime, she can con®-
dently estimate the likelihood of such scenarios. Empirical investigation of the sort under-
taken by most psychologists chie¯y concerns general patterns, not isolated instances, 
 For philosophical objections to the FFM, see: Doris (2002, 67-71); Prinz (2009, 120-122); Miller 8
(2014, ch. 6); Miller (2015). Alfano (2013) basically dismisses it as irrelevant to virtue ethics within 
two pages (52-53).
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which may be unique for all anyone knows (Ross and Nisbett 1991, 114-115). The con®-
dence of psychological predictions stems from knowledge of the person whose behaviour 
is predicted, which in turn comes from aggregated data, collected from reports and behav-
iours. Ordinary people likewise infer from knowing others over time, and predict behav-
iours inductively. What we rely on psychologists to con®rm is whether trait attributions 
ground con®dent predictions. Thereafter, presumably those best acquainted with a person, 
using relevant knowledge, can most con®dently predict how that person will respond under 
given circumstances. Still, their predictions will be powerful, not infallible. This is to be ex-
pected of imperfect creatures like ourselves, philosophical ideals notwithstanding (Bad-
hwar 2009). And if virtue ethics is committed to working with a plausible descriptive psy-
chology, it too will understand trait attributions to refer to general patterns and reasonably 
con®dent predictions.9
Doris also objects that since questionnaires can say nothing about the behavioural 
ef®cacy of FFM traits, it remains unclear whether traits relate to behaviours (see Doris 
2002, 67-70; cf. Prinz 2009, 121).
I have already suggested that ones close acquaintances are those who know one 
best. Their knowledge comes partly from past behaviours, which psychologists can collect 
by questionnaires, cross-examine, and factor-analyse, yielding remarkably consistent re-
sults. Questionnaires moreover allow psychologists to conduct longitudinal studies, which 
Doris thinks are highly desirable, but hard to carry out (Doris 2002, 38). So Doris scepti-
cism seems unwarranted, lest it concerns quantitative research in general; that would be 
ill-advised given his own reliance on quantitative research to corroborate situationism.
Anyhow, while crucial for arriving at the FFM, establishment and corroboration 
thereof goes well beyond questionnaires and reports. By now, numerous studies have ex-
 Adams (2007, 122ff) construes virtues probabilistically: more or less virtue concerns probabilities 9
of exhibiting virtuous behaviour under given circumstances.
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amined correlations between questionnaire results, and important behaviours and life out-
comes. The FFM powerfully predicts, inter alia, marital satisfaction and divorce (e.g. Kelly 
and Conley 1987), mortality (e.g. Friedman et al. 1995), and pathologies including addic-
tion (e.g. Slutske et al. 2005; Swendsen et al. 2002), depression (e.g. Watson and Clark 
1988), and schizotypy (e.g. Gurrera et al. 2005).
In one longitudinal study, for instance, researchers tracked three-hundred couples 
for ®fty-two years, comparing friends ratings of subjects personalities with data on their 
marriage state, ®nding high Neuroticism and low Conscientiousness to powerfully predict 
unhappy relationships and divorces, whilst their contraries predicted lifelong, happy part-
nerships (Kelly and Conley 1987). A similar longitudinal study showed low Conscientious-
ness to strongly predict early death (Friedman et al. 1995), meta-analyses ®nding correla-
tions around .30 (Boggs and Roberts 2004), which is remarkable considering both what is 
at stake, and that several factors determine when one dies. While something else may 
also explain ®ndings, given that low Conscientiousness involves irresponsible, uninhibited 
behaviour associated with addiction, impulsiveness, etc., the traits behavioural ef®cacy is 
a safe bet.10
The most recent method for studying FFM traits behavioural ef®cacy is experience 
sampling. Subjects are given a palm pilot or some equivalent, allowing them to describe 
their behaviours every few hours, often over several weeks. The instruments interference 
 I should note that any correlations in the .30 ballpark mentioned in this section are not subject to 10
the criticism that correlation coef®cients for personality measures stagnate at around .30, which 
mainly concerns single item behavioural measures (Doris 2002, 72), since the correlations cited 
herein concern meta-analytic results for predictions of major life outcomes (almost inevitably con-
taining a wide range of results if they are any good), as well as moment-by-moment behavioural 
predictions. Questioning the importance of .30 correlations for such measures manifests insensitiv-
ity to our subject matter, namely human psychology. 
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is minimal, descriptions only taking a couple of minutes to complete. Results are then 
compared to participants trait levels acquired from questionnaires completed by partici-
pants and their acquaintances. This method allows psychologists to examine not only 
general behavioural patterns, but also the extent to which factors and facets predict con-
crete behavioural sequences in agents ordinary life, whilst additionally informing re-
searchers on the frequency of trait-relevant behaviours, and how extreme such behaviours 
are. Studies of this type have thus far yielded highly signi®cant correlations (Conner et al. 
2009).
Data analysis from ®fteen experience-sampling studies conducted over eight years, 
and comprising over twenty-thousand behavioural reports from around ®ve-hundred partic-
ipants, returned reassuring correlations, con®rmed by meta-analysis. The lowest, though 
still signi®cant correlations, ranging from .18-.37, mostly exceeding .30, were between 
traits and single behaviours; given the possibility of error and the situation-sensitivity of 
FFM traits, this is unsurprising. Higher correlations were found between trait levels and 
trait-relevant behavioural extremes, ranging between .34-.54 for maximum and .22-.37 for 
minimum trait levels. The highest correlations, between .40-.56, were between trait levels 
and behavioural averages (Fleeson and Galagher 2009). It is noteworthy that other expe-
rience-sampling studies have found correlations between trait levels and behavioural av-
erages in the .7-.9 ballpark (Fleeson 2001). Very similar results have been acquired by 
more recent experience sampling studies which tested the foregoing measures across a 
number of different cultures (Ching et al. 2014), as well as different age groups (Wrzus, 
Wagner and Reidiger 2015).
Worries remain, of course, pertaining, for instance, to the honesty of participants; 
their perceptions of their own behaviours; and the fact that having a palm pilot makes them 
more self-conscious. But seen in conjunction with the foregoing evidence, and the fact that 
evidence is growing, results from these studies provide strong support for the FFM per-
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sonality structure and, contra Doris, suggest that FFM traits satisfactorily predict individu-
als behaviours. Moreover, they suggest that FFM traits not only correlate positively with 
aggregates, nor do they only predict major outcomes, but can also, moderately, but impor-
tantly, predict individual, moment-by-moment behaviours.
Psychology is not the only ®eld validating the FFM. Findings in other disciplines 
con®rm relevant theoretical hypotheses. First, since FFM dimensions are common to all 
humans, they are probably shaped by evolution and genetically heritable. Studies show 
that biological siblings, who share half of their genetic material that varies between human 
individuals, resemble each other in personality, whereas adoptive siblings brought up to-
gether no more resemble one another in personalities than random people. Identical twins, 
who are genetically identical, have highly similar personalities, which resemblance persists 
be they raised together or apart. Furthermore, identical twins raised apart are more alike in 
personality than non-identical twins raised apart. Such ®ndings suggest a genetic basis for 
FFM personality, and genetic variation is estimated to account for approximately half of 
personality variation (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001; Bouchard and McGue 2003).
Second, sophisticated evolutionary hypotheses are available. Nettle proposes that 
human personality has evolved through ¯uctuating selection, arguing that both high and 
low levels of each factor would have conferred advantages and disadvantages depending 
on ancestral environments (Nettle 2007, 69-70). High Neuroticism, for example, would 
have bene®tted individuals in environments swarming with predators and poor defence, 
because greater responsiveness to threat would have motivated ¯ight from threats. Con-
versely, low Neuroticism would have allowed those in safer environments to improve their 
lives (121-122).11
 Nettle (2007, 99-101, 151-152, 177-181, 201-207) puts forward equally plausible evolutionary 11
hypotheses for the ¯uctuating selection of the remaining traits.
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Finally, if traits target affective-cognitive domains, they must tap into corresponding 
neurobiological mechanisms. Studies suggest that serotonin levels, and activity in the 
amygdala and limbic system, which relate to responsiveness to threat, vary dramatically 
between people different in Neuroticism (Whittle et al. 2006; Nettle 2005, ch. 5). Similarly, 
differences in Extraversion relate to the brains reward systems responsiveness (Depue 
and Collins 1999; Canli 2004); activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which partakes 
in response inhibition, varies with levels of Conscientiousness (Nettle 2007, 141ff.); 
Agreeableness relates to social-cognitive theory of mind functioning, which refers to the 
ability to infer about the content of others mental states and to use the relevant beliefs to 
predict and explain behaviour (Nettle and Liddle 2008, 325), and empathising levels (Net-
tle 2007b). Research has not yet identi®ed mechanisms corresponding to Openness, but 
the aforementioned relation between high Openness and schizotypy holds promise in that 
direction. Other trait extremes also relate to pathological conditions, again in line with pre-
dictions based on trait descriptions. Low Conscientiousness, for instance, is associated 
with addiction (Slutske et al. 2005; Swendsen et al. 2002); high Neuroticism with depres-
sion and other psychiatric disorders (Claridge and Davis 2001; Watson et al. 2005), and 
low Agreeableness with psychopathy (Harpur et al. 1994; Lynam et al. 2005).
Jointly, the foregoing offer overwhelming support for the FFM, compelling us to ac-
cept the existence of the relevant traits.
Before proceeding to draw conclusions about the FFMs implications for situation-
ism, however, I should say something about Millers worries regarding the FFMs meta-
physical status. Miller points to a debate among personality psychologists concerning 
whether the traits are mere summary labels, i.e., terms we use to describe general behav-
ioural patterns, or causally ef®cacious psychological dispositions. Miller notes that, if the 
former, then these should not [be] expected  to reliably predict how a person will act 
from moment to moment (Miller 2014, 136). Interpreted as suggesting that the relevant 
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predictions are fairly or moderately con®dent, then I think that the evidence sampled 
above, while inconclusive, does suggest an adequate degree of con®dence in moment-by-
moment predictions. This is most clear in the case of experience-sampling method studies 
and meta-analytic results which actually do measure momentary behavioural and affective 
responses, indicating that FFM traits do seem to predict moment-to-moment behaviours 
with some con®dence. It is important to note that such predictions are achieved without 
appeal to contextual considerations, which no doubt would enhance predictive power. For 
instance, if someone low in Extraversion is thrown into a party, we can be pretty con®dent 
that she will feel highly uncomfortable. While this does not show FFM traits to be causally 
ef®cacious dispositions, it does detract from the plausibility of their construal as mere
summary labels.
Of course, such data cannot establish metaphysical status. However, jointly with the 
®ndings linking FFM traits to neurobiological mechanisms, the plausible evolutionary hy-
potheses explaining the observable behavioural variability, and the genetic basis of these 
traits, the evidence should at least strengthen the suggestion that FFM traits are more than 
just summary labels. Moreover, I think that understanding FFM traits as causal dispositions 
will give us a much better backdrop against which we can develop psychological theories.
Thus, while perhaps any stronger claims here would be premature, what we can 
con®dently say is that FFM traits can do a good deal more than what Miller expects of 
traits as mere summary labels.
FFM and Situationism
FFM personality traits are (1) universal, in the sense that everyone has a score along each 
dimension, hence everyone possesses such traits; (2) global, i.e. temporally stable and 
cross-situationally consistent dispositions to respond cognitively-affectively, while most are 
also associated with characteristic behaviours. Finally, FFM traits do not yield characteris-
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tic responses irrespective of circumstances. Instead, they are (3) relational, i.e., a matter of 
where ones threshold lies for activation of certain cognitive-affective responses to certain 
types of object.
It follows from this construal of traits that situationists are setting up a false di-
chotomy. In construing prediction and explanation of behaviour as largely an either/or affair 
between character and situations, they are conceiving of traits as insensitive to circum-
stances, moods, etc. Psychological evidence, however, shows this to be an inaccurate 
conception of traits, manifestation of which is situation-dependent.
Furthermore, peoples lives carve observable and predictable patterns of behaviour 
and of affective-cognitive responses to situations. Since such patterns are in place, there 
are global character traits, and the FFM dissolves a strong reading of situationism. More-
over, situationisms claim that peoples responses depend on situations is trivial given the 
relational conception of character traits, i.e., just what is expected of beings responsive to 
their surroundings. 
III. THE FFM AND VIRTUE ETHICS
Further to the metaphysical worry mentioned above, Miller thinks that if the FFM in-
cludes traits understood as dispositions to form certain mental states, as are the virtues 
and vices, it is empirically inadequate, because the FFM trait structure includes traits like 
compassion and modesty in the face of evidence undermining the assumption that people 
generally have such traits. But of course, one may be mostly compassionate without being 
virtuous. So even if Miller is right that most people do not have the virtues of compassion 
or altruism, this does not show that FFM traits are not dispositions to form beliefs, etc., but 
that they are not virtues. But we have not claimed that the FFM traits are virtues. 
Still, perhaps FFM traits are such as can allow for the virtues to be shaped into be-
ing. While I cannot establish this claim here, in this section I take three steps in its direction 
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(though I will not be suggesting that most people do in fact possess traits like full-blown 
honesty or altruism): ®rst, that FFM traits are malleable in light of mental states such as 
beliefs, goals, etc., and so their content can be moulded; second, that the moral salience 
of at least some FFM traits should be considered fairly uncontroversial; and third, more 
tentatively, that FFM traits moral relevance structurally parallels Aristotles doctrine of the 
mean. 
Jointly, I think, my theses on FFM traitsnamely that, in light of the evidence sup-
porting the FFM, they are plausibly (a) global dispositions, which are (b) suitably mal-
leable, i.e., changeable in light of beliefs, practice, experience etc., and, some of which are 
(c) morally salientshould at the very least show that these are traits that virtue ethics 
should take seriously. More ambitiously, I hope to take some steps towards the proposal 
that FFM traits are psychological dispositions that, under suitable conditions, can vindicate 
virtue ethics.
FFM Traits and Malleability
Above we saw that, according to Doris, if traits are to service virtue ethics, they 
must be manipulable, for it is traditionally held that we are responsible for our characters. 
But FFM traits are said to be approximately 50% heritable, with the rest of the variation 
said to owe largely to factors outside our control. So FFM traits, the ®rst objection goes, 
hardly resemble the cultivable and malleable traits postulated in virtue ethics (cf. Prinz 
2009, 121-122).
Now, most psychologists grant that the FFM is not meant to exhaust the content, 
structure, or operation of personality (even McCrae 2010, 58-61). So the genetic heritabili-
ty of FFM traits does not entail that our inner lives and behaviour are determined by them. 
Furthermore, although some evidence suggests that FFM traits are remarkably stable (for 
example, Terraciano et al. 2006), this does not show that people cannot change their per-
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sonality; only that they generally do not. But not even the latter is obvious, as recent evi-
dence amply supports the claim that FFM traits are malleable.
First, Openness, as measured by personality questionnaires, has been found to 
signi®cantly increase even in old age, in response to performance of basic cognitive activi-
ties including inductive reasoning tutorial and engagement with tasks like puzzle-solving, 
over the course of thirty weeks (Jackson et al. 2012).
Second, the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) offers powerful 
evidence for FFM personality malleability. By identifying certain cognitive patterns that are 
thought to underlie pathologies like addiction and depression, through conversation, intro-
spection, etc., CBT allows people to re-conceptualise past experiences, including emo-
tional responses and behaviours, thereby altering their affective-cognitive response pat-
terns. CBT is particularly successful in regulating high Neuroticism, and treating associat-
ed conditions (Ragby et al. 2008). Psychiatric evidence suggests that CBT is at least as 
effective than alternative treatments (usually pharmacotherapy) in dealing with, inter alia, 
depression, generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder, social phobia, obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder, anger, and sexual offence. More importantly, CBT is thought to have 
longer-lasting effects, often proving twice as effective as alternatives in preventing relapse 
(Butler et al. 2006).
CBTs widely acknowledged success suggests that formulating the right goals and 
developing cognitive techniques can change personality, at least when trait levels are ex-
treme. But there is no reason to think that changeability per se is limited to extremes; if 
anything, the reverse is likelier. Of course, because certain personality extremes are highly 
undesirable, they are met with increased concern, and greater motivation and effort to pal-
liate.
These remarks may remind the reader that earlier in this paper I undertook to return 
to the third thesis that Doris attributes to globalist conceptions of character, namely evalua-
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tive integration. This, remember, is the claim that the occurrence of a given trait with a cer-
tain evaluative valence, should be probabilistically (positively) related to other traits with 
similar valence. For it would seem that if FFM personality change is an empirically sup-
portable phenomenon, then we might expect at least some evaluative integration to be 
traceable between an agents traits, at least those that are of similar valence or pertain to 
similar practical considerations. Admittedly, there is little support for such a thesis. But then 
again, extensive evaluative integration pertains to virtues and vices, which I do not wish to 
con¯ate with unquali®ed FFM traits, and is moreover a controversial requirement. That 
said, I think that ®ndings suggest that evaluative integration is not altogether alien in hu-
man psychology.12
Available research on personality change, aside from having discredited a view 
whereby FFM traits are ®xed after early adulthood (e.g. McCrae and Costa 1996; cf. Sri-
vastava et al. 2003) also reveals certain clear patterns of change, which psychologists call 
normative.
One cohort of evidence clearly indicates patters of personality change with age. 
Neuroticism has been found to decrease, while Agreeableness and Conscientiousness
increase, the latters covariance with age being extremely stable and systematic (Helson 
et al 2002, 293). Such ®ndings are well-documented. For instance, a meta-analysis of 
ninety-two longitudinal studies of personality mean-level change (i.e., change in personali-
ty measures of a group, rather than individuals within it) featuring people from different age 
groups, for instance, found that there is a clear pattern of increase in the dimensions of Ex-
traversion, and especially the facets of social vitality and social dominance, Openness, 
 Of course, facets do tend to cluster together, otherwise psychologists could not have arrived at 12
the ®ve broad dimensions of the FFM through factor analysis, since the only factors variables that 
are strongly intercorrelated. Thus, some degree of integration, albeit not evaluative strictly speak-
ing, appears to cohere with our psychological makeup.
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and, Conscientiousness, which last was the strongest and most frequently recurrent ®nd-
ing, as well as a decrease in Neuroticism (Roberts et al 2006), with age. While this meta-
analysis did not ®nd signi®cant changes in Agreeableness others have found that trait lev-
els of this dimension also generally increase (Specht et al. 2011; Roberts et al. 2004). Sim-
ilar conclusions are suggested by studies looking at rank-order consistency of personality 
(i.e., consistency of individuals placement in terms of their trait levels relative to a group), 
which found that there is a clear increase in stability, reaching a plateau between sixty and 
seventy years of age, though not of a magnitude that would preclude further change 
(Roberts and DelVecchio 2000).13
Although more work in this area is needed, studies of the causes of personality 
change have found signi®cant correlations between personality and the goals people 
have, something found to be particularly important for changes in Agreeableness, which 
relate to having morally salient concerns (Roberts et al. 2004) but also between change in 
goals and change in personality, not explicable through personality traits alone (Roberts et 
al. 2004). The discussion of CBT above lends further credence to the claim that personali-
ty changes in light of mental states, such as beliefs, etc. Similarly, a recent study found 
that college-aged adult personality tends on the whole to improve but does so at least 
partly in patterns that reveal correlations between peoples prospects and ideals, including 
moral ones (Noftle 2015).
Hence, available research shows a generaland generally desirabletrend. As 
several personality psychologists have noted, the direction of change is clearly  positive 
 With age, people become more con®dent, warm, responsible, and calm  Social matu-
rity is equated with the capacity to become a productive and involved contributor to soci-
ety. (Roberts and Mroczek 2008, 3; cf. Roberts et al. 2006, 20). Research also reveals 
that such change does not occur in everyone (especially not in those with already very 
 Recall the study noted earlier, which found simple tasks can increase Openness even in old age. 13
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high levels on these dimensions), that some change contrary to the normative trend, and 
also that change depends at least partly on agents goals, prospects, ideals, and so on (cf. 
McAdams and Olson 2010). 
Certain traits, including the virtues, are desirable; moreover some of the traits in the 
FFM resemble virtues in their content, Conscientiousness for instance having clear rela-
tions to epistemic virtues, and Agreeableness comprising facets like altruism and empathy, 
modesty, etc.; it is also a commonplace that the virtues require experience and knowledge 
(and phronêsis). Given the foregoing considerations, it is not, I think, implausible to take 
seriously the suggestion that things are as one might have expected: people grow older, 
they mature (hence psychologists phrasematurity principlefor the trend, e.g. Blonin-
gen et al. 2008, 256), acquiring a more sophisticated view of the world, gaining experience 
and knowledge, becoming more sensitive to the demands of others, including friends and 
family, as well as their personal and professional development. For instance, seeing as 
Conscientiousness concerns self-control, reasoning, and prudence, it is plausible that ex-
perience, knowledge, and maturity are key to increases in Conscientiousness with age.
Now, I take it that addressing the objection against the claim that FFM traits are 
suitably malleable involves showing that personality can change on the basis of beliefs 
and other mental states, and people have the required cognitive and motivational re-
sources for change.  These conditions obtain. Ergo, FFM traits are suitably malleable, 14
hence we are to that extent responsible for our personality. Moreover, I suggested that 
there does seem to be some degree of evaluative integration, or a tendency towards it, 
increasing with age, in personalities representative of the general population. Seeing as 
 Some situationists (Olin and Doris 2014; Alfano 2013, 111-180) have recently targeted the epis14 -
temic virtues. But I take my requirement here to amount to something weaker than a requirement 
for epistemic virtues, to discredit which would require independent argument on the part of situa-
tions.
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the general population is far from virtuous or vicious, it is unclear whether we should cast 
any more doubt on the psychological adequacy of evaluative integration than on global-
ism.
FFM and Moral Character
Virtue depends on deeper forces than peoples perceptions of one another or overt behav-
iours. But, another objection claims, it is only the latter that the foregoing studies examine. 
Because questionnaires fail to capture salient information, they cannot ascertain that peo-
ple possess virtues and vices (Miller 2014, 147-150; Prinz 2009, 121). FFM traits, then, 
may be morally insigni®cant.
This objection fails to observe the dialectic. Under the strong reading, situationists 
argue: character traits understood as global dispositions are extremely rare (if they exist at 
all); virtues are global dispositions; hence there are virtues are extremely rare (if they exist 
at all). But nearly everyone has global traits, so that the ®rst premise of the situationist ar-
gument just summarised is false. Hence, there is no reason to remain sceptical about 
whether the psychological theory presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically 
sustainable (Olin and Doris 2014, 665). The burden of proof is on the situationists to show 
that virtue ethics is empirically unsustainable. The prospects for this, moreover, are bleak: 
virtues and vices would have to be very uncharacteristic character traits indeed if the situa-
tionist case is to remain convincing.
While I could rest my case here, I think that some brief remarks by way of response 
are in order. If the objector means to suggest that psychological research should include 
qualitative measures, then I agree. But if instead the objector insists that questionnaires, 
on pain of being morally uninformative, should include sets of conditionals, more detail, 
etc., as some have suggested (e.g. McAdams 1992; Miller 2014, 138-140), then I ®nd the 
worry exaggerated. For regardless of how satisfactory questionnaires are, their results 
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strong correlations with morally-salient behaviours cannot be ignored when considering 
traits moral salience. And while behaviour cannot conclusively demonstrate that anyone is 
virtuousI am uncertain what might achieve thisthis does not mean that it is uninforma-
tive about peoples characters. Doris himself assumes that if habits contrary to a trait [do] 
not undermine the attribution, it is hard to see what possibly could. (Doris 2002, 26) Mu-
tatis mutandis, people who generally behave altruistically and are seen as altruistic, short 
of contrary evidence, should have altruism attributed to them. This is perhaps more intu-
itive for vices, since appeals to nice motives, right beliefs, or whatever, are unlikely to hold 
of an abusive parent or partner, a cheat, or a psychopath.
Studies have found low Conscientiousness and Agreeableness to strongly correlate 
with academic dishonesty, a result con®rmed by meta-analysis (Giluk and Postlethwaite 
2015). Low Agreeableness is also an important predictor of vengefulness in romantic rela-
tionships (Sheppard and Boon 2012; Lee and Ashton 2012), as is Low Conscientiousness
for in®delity (Orzeck and Lung 2005). Moreover, studies suggest that Extraversion, a 
seemingly less morally salient dimension, predicts sexual behaviour potentially harmful 
both to oneself and partners (Schmitt 2004; Miller et al. 2004). Additionally, low Agreeable-
ness signi®cantly predicts responsiveness to aggressive cues and proneness to aggres-
sive behaviour (Meier et al. 2006), something also supported in meta-analyses (Jones et 
al. 2011). Lastly, Agreeableness has been found to predict obedience in a Milgram-type 
setup (Bègue et al. 2014).
Strong correlations between FFM traits and pathologies are also morally signi®cant; 
as I mentioned earlier, the psychopath, plausibly the archetype of evil, has been found to 
be characteristically low in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness; and FFM traits corre-
late with, inter alia, Narcissism, characterised by (unjust) preferential treatment, and 
Machiavellianism, characterised by manipulativeness (Lee and Ashton 2005).
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This brief sample of ®ndings doubtless reveals a morally salient aspect of FFM 
traits, at least on the level of behaviour. Doubting such salience, therefore, is not, I think, 
an option for those wishing to take psychological research seriously in discussing virtue 
ethics.
FFM, Moral Salience, and the Doctrine of the Mean
Notice that the ®ndings above, apart from clearly showing the moral salience of certain 
FFM traits, also hint at a resemblance between such traits and Aristotles conception of the 
virtues as dispositions intermediate between two extremesone of excess and another of 
de®ciencyeach of which is a vice, best known as the doctrine of the mean (Aristotle 
1998, 43-44). This is insofar as morally relevant behaviours (especially negative ones), are 
related to traits at either a high or low extreme of the relevant dimensions. In light of this, 
before concluding I would like to suggest that FFM traits recommend this structure by 
showing that three dimensions comprise traits conceptually related to virtues, whose ex-
tremes plausibly degenerate into vices, while the remaining two dimensions pertain to in-
tellectual virtues. The discussion here is necessarily somewhat speculative, given the 
dearth of research on this matter. However, in conjunction with the foregoing, it should 
strengthen my case against situationism whilst pointing to potentially fruitful avenues for 
future research.
(i) Neuroticism
Neuroticism concerns ones threshold for fear, anxiety, and stress, which are among its 
facets. Aristotle de®nes courage as the meanwith regards to feelings of fear and con®-
dence (Aristotle 1998, 40). The courageous are not fearlessfearlessness precludes 
courage; nor are they so sensitive that their fear overcomes any desire or motivation to 
fend for their values. Fear is necessary for courage, which latter largely concerns how 
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much one fears what, and to what extent fear inhibits or motivates action relative to worth-
while ends. Some level of Neuroticism, then, is necessary for courage. Plausibly, however, 
too little Neuroticism may result in recklessness or rashness, whilst too much in cowardice. 
Thus, courage requires an intermediate level of Neuroticism.
(ii) Agreeableness
Agreeableness facets include empathy, altruism, and trust. These look like virtues in their 
own right; even if this is denied, they relate to traits like friendliness and sociability, and are 
at least necessary for virtues like cooperativeness, love, and honesty. Considering how 
Agreeableness might feature in the doctrine of the mean is trickier. Low Agreeableness
involves lack of empathy, altruism, and trust. As aforementioned, it relates to psychopathy, 
and plausibly also vices like callousness and hostility. As for high Agreeableness, a recent 
experiment with a Milgram setup found that subjects who administered the most severe 
shocks to confederates were those highest in Agreeableness (Bégue et al. 2014). Thus, 
even high Agreeableness can be vicious if cooperativeness and a desire to please turn 
into submissiveness. Empathy and altruism should be balanced against accurate percep-
tion of the bene®ciaries and potential reasons for withholding pro-social behaviour.
(iii) Extraversion
Extraversion targets the enjoyment of pleasures, its facets including gregariousness and 
warmth, excitement- and pleasure-seeking. According to Aristotle, this sphere has its par-
ticular virtue, namely temperance, which requires neither excessive preoccupation with 
pleasures, particularly those of food, drink, and sex, nor indifference towards them. An in-
difference towards these would fall short of excellence, which requires an immersion in the 
full gamut of worthy human activity, of which pleasures form a considerable part. More-
over, such pleasures often accompany those of good company and collegiality, so that in 
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the sphere of social life insensateness can convert the prudent comrade into a miserly 
bore. Conversely, indulgence in pleasure, concomitant to high Extraversion, may degener-
ate into vice, behaviours stemming therefrom including excessive eating or drinking, but 
also, as indeed studies con®rm, in®delity in romantic relationships, and sexual behaviour 
potentially harmful both for oneself and partners, all of which high Extraversion strongly 
predicts (Schmitt 2004; Miller et al. 2004; Orzeck and Lung 2005).
(iv) Openness
Openness facets include imaginativeness, intellectual curiosity, and readiness to scruti-
nise established values. These are undoubtedly important and essential to virtue, though 
plausibly intellectual, rather than moral, virtue and, moreover, contemplative, as opposed 
to calculative, intellectual virtues, which concern truth, probing, searching, etc., rather 
than practical reasoning. Intellectual sluggishness, unimaginativeness, and stubbornness 
are the prima facie vices corresponding to low Openness. 
Unlike the moral virtues, Aristotle did not accommodate the intellectual virtues in the 
doctrine of the mean, so I shall refrain from suggesting that they ®t therein. That said, I 
have already noted that extremes of Openness, do wind up pathological, with schizotypy 
at the high end of Openness. Similarly, obsessive-compulsive personality disorder corre-
sponds to very high Conscientiousness, which I shortly suggest is also plausibly linked to 
intellectual virtue. I am therefore sceptical that indiscriminately high levels of intellectually-
relevant FFM traits cohere with virtue, though a fuller discussion of this will have to await a 
different occasion. 
(v) Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness comprises, inter alia, self-discipline, perceived importance of ful®lling 
ones moral duties, and means-end reasoning aptitude. Such facets bring to mind Platos 
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notion of sôphrosunê, which refers to sound-mindedness, moderation, prudence. 
Sôphrosunê concerns weighing ones own strengths and weaknesses, ensuring that these 
factor into ones responses and decisions, etc., and that one does not over- or under-react. 
Conscientiousness also resembles Aristotles notion of continence, or enkrateia, which, 
though not a virtue, like prudence, it keeps the virtuous from extreme behaviours through 
self-control. Low Conscientiousness can clearly lead to undesirable behaviours and seeing 
as it is strongly associated with addictive behaviours, including eating disorders, alco-
holism, and gambling, it is implausible to sever it from virtue.
Finally, Conscientiousness relation to sôphrosunê and means-end reasoning apti-
tude also suggests a possible link to phronêsis. Phronêsis is the chief calculative intellec-
tual virtue, inasmuch as it pertains to the rationality of the structure of ones motivation and 
deliberation, thereby sustaining moral virtue. Conscientiousness concerns, inter alia, ones 
degree of emphasis placed on ful®lling moral obligations; strength of will in carrying out 
plans and actions despite dif®culties; and ones tendency and skill at reasoning prior to re-
sponding. While not exhausting phronêsis, since it also depends on knowledge acquired 
from experience, phronêsis presupposes these facets, albeit they have not been theorised 
under the present terminology and have largely been the focus of philosophical work. 
Thus, perhaps the FFM opens up the way for empirical research into phronêsis, promising 
further insights into virtue ethics.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the FFM overcomes problems confronting virtue ethics under a strong 
interpretation of situationism whereby situationism questions the widespread existence not 
of virtue and vices, but of character traits understood as temporally stable and cross-situa-
tionally consistent dispositions. Moreover, I have tried to show that the FFM dimensions 
may yet vindicate virtue ethics in meeting such requirements for virtues and vices as mal-
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leability, moral salience, and in structurally resembling Aristotles virtues and vices as per 
his doctrine of the mean. A promising descriptive framework is available; rather than wal-
low in scepticism, virtue ethicists should cooperate with personality psychologists to con-
ceptually re®ne it and carve out an adequate normative proposal, while working on improv-
ing our understanding of how moral education is best achievable.15
 I am grateful to Berys Gaut for encouraging me to write this paper and for invaluable comments 15
on previous drafts. I would also like to thank Benjamin Sachs for comments on parts of an earlier 
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